

Job Protection versus Independence: The Importance of Employment Characteristics in Determining Job Satisfaction in Chile.

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Abstract

Due to data constraints and traditional employment indicators disregarding qualitative aspects of the working life, our understanding of the determinants of job satisfaction in developing countries is still very limited. We use data from a unique, nationally representative survey, which contains extensive information on quantitative and qualitative characteristics of employment, to investigate the determinants of job satisfaction in Chile. Consistent with the dualistic view of labor markets, job protection appears to be mainly a positive determinant of job satisfaction rather than a cost to be avoided by engaging in informal activities. Further, we find self-employed workers to be penalized by the lack of valuable workplace facilities, such as decent toilets and clean water. However, working in the self-employment sector does not necessarily mean taking the “bad” jobs. We show that self-employed workers derive procedural utility from being independent, as do their counterparts in industrial countries.

Keywords: Job satisfaction, Self-employment, Job protection, Procedural utility, Developing countries.

JEL codes: J81; L22; M54; O17; O54

1) Introduction

Employment is certainly one of the most important dimensions of life. Not only does it represent the primary source of income for most people in the world, but also a large part of our lifetime is spent working. Furthermore, employment can grant a sense of fulfillment and dignity (Sen and ILO, 1975). The economic research on happiness has shown that unemployed individuals are substantially less satisfied with their life than workers (Frey and Stutzer, 2002). Therefore, it is extremely important for policy-makers to understand individuals' employment preferences in order to improve labor market conditions.

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In this respect, traditional approaches to labor market indicators have two main weaknesses (Lugo, 2007). First, they mainly focus on quantitative, outcome-oriented aspects of employment, such as wages and hours of work. Thus, by disregarding the qualitative and procedural characteristics of the working life, they fail to give an exhaustive representation of labor market conditions. Second, even when labor force data are collected at an individual level, they usually do not contain extensive information on household characteristics. These shortcomings are of particular relevance to developing countries, where informal employment and poverty are predominant. This raises the need to design and test alternative indicators of employment characteristics, which ought to be collected at an individual level and whose respective questions should be included in household questionnaires.

An emerging literature on industrial countries addresses some of these issues by analyzing subjective well-being data related to employment. Job satisfaction is indeed becoming an increasingly popular subject in the economic literature as it is found to be relevant to understand individuals' behavior and to predict labor market mobility (Freeman, 1978; Clark, 2001).

Economists have been particularly interested in investigating the relationship of job satisfaction with other economic variables, including unionism (Borjas, 1979; Meng, 1990), income and education (Clark and Oswald, 1996), and job security (Blanchflower and Oswald, 1999; Clark, 2001).

Among the determinants of job satisfaction, self-employment stands out. There is consistent evidence within and across Western and Non-Western industrialized countries that self-employed workers are more satisfied with their jobs than employees, even after controlling for socio-demographic and economic characteristics (Blanchflower and Freeman, 1997; Blanchflower and Oswald, 1998; Blanchflower, 2000; Blanchflower et al., 2001).

Some studies go even further by identifying what the factors are behind the utility premium from self-employment. The results consistently show that the greater job satisfaction reported by the self-employed is due to procedural preferences for independence (Eden, 1975; Hamilton, 2000; Hundley, 2001; Benz and Frey, 2008a; 2008b). Workers attribute positive intrinsic value to independence as compared to hierarchy, at least in the employment sphere.¹ This finding raises the question of why the share of self-employment in industrial countries is still low. The mainstream literature suggests that credit constraints represent the major barrier of entry to self-employment for workers in industrial countries (Blanchflower and Oswald, 1998).

Alas, because of data constraints, the existing literature on job satisfaction mainly focuses on the industrialized world.² There is no reason to believe that these findings should necessarily hold in the developing world. The traditional dualistic view of the labor market in developing countries suggests quite the opposite. Being self-employed implies having the

¹ However, economists are just starting to study procedural utility. Given the studies available so far, it might be too soon for a generalization of the results to all individuals. For instance, Fuchs-Schündeln (2009) provides some evidence that procedural preferences for independence are heterogeneous across the population. This makes our study even more interesting because it might well be that workers from non industrialized countries do not value procedural utility from independence.

² In the cross-countries study from Benz and Frey (2008b), the sample includes Bangladesh and the Philippines. However, they only have a limited number of control variables (age, gender, education, income, and hours of work). Hinks (2009) investigates some determinants of job satisfaction in South Africa; however, informal employment and self-employment are excluded from the analysis.

“bad” jobs, with a low wage and no job protection. Working in the self-employment sector is not seen as a voluntary choice, but as the only option left to workers who are rationed out of the formal wage employment.³ This view emphasizes the importance of income and job protection in increasing workers’ utility, but leaves no role for procedural utility from independence and empowerment at work.

Some recent studies have started to question this dualistic view of the relationship between formal and informal sectors in developing countries, with interesting results (Maloney, 1999; 2004; Fajnzylber et al., 2006; Falco et al., 2010). More specifically, Maloney (1999) identifies two factors that may deter workers from choosing formal wage work. First, labor protection laws usually have an implicit tax on workers, namely that non-wage benefits are compensated by a lower wage. It could well be that workers prefer to evade these implicit taxes by engaging in informal activities. Because of its rigidities and monetary costs, job protection is not necessarily seen as a positive determinant of job satisfaction. Second, consistent with the procedural utility argument, workers might be attracted by other characteristics of informal work, such as flexibility and independence. In contrast with the dualistic view, entering the informal sector is mainly seen as a voluntary choice of the worker. The study by Fajnzylber (2006) on Mexican workers’ mobility provides additional evidence in favor of this argument.

This paper uses a unique, nationally representative data set, designed and collected by the Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative (OPHI), to investigate the determinants of job satisfaction in Chile. The data set is based on a multi-topic survey, and as such, it has a unique advantage: in addition to the standard demographic and socio-economic variables already present in the CASEN (Encuesta de Caracterización Socioeconómica Nacional), it contains detailed information on both the quantitative and qualitative aspects of employment (Lugo, 2007), agency and empowerment (Ibrahim and Alkire, 2007), physical safety (Diprose, 2007), and subjective well-being (Samman, 2007). This allows us to construct and test several indicators of quality of employment: job protection, occupational hazard, and independence/empowerment at work.

The picture of informal employment that emerges from this analysis is somewhat a compromise between the different theories just described. Consistent with the dualistic theory of labor markets, job protection appears to be a positive determinant of job satisfaction rather than a cost to be avoided by engaging in informal activities. Further, we find self-employed workers to be penalized by the lack of valuable workplace facilities, such as decent toilets and clean water. If we account for heterogeneous self-employment, the raw mean differences show a significantly higher job satisfaction for employees than for self-employed workers with their own-account businesses.

On the other hand, working in the informal sector, and especially being self-employed, does not always mean taking the “bad” jobs. We find that after controlling for either job protection or occupational hazard, self-employed workers are significantly more satisfied with their jobs than employees. The self-employment utility premium fully disappears once we control for self-determination/empowerment at work. This provides evidence that Chilean workers have procedural preferences for independence just as their counterparts in industrial countries do. Finally, if we account for heterogeneous self-employment, we find that the self-

³ See for instance Harris (1970), Tokman (1978), and more recently Chandra (1993).

employed who are also “employers” report a higher job satisfaction than employees unconditional of income, job protection, and occupational hazard. Taken together, these results cannot exclude that some workers self-select into the informal sector.

The paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we describe the data. In section 3, we define the indicators of quality of employment and provide the descriptive statistics. Section 4 focuses on the empirical results, including the robustness checks. Section 5 accounts for heterogeneous self-employment by making the distinction between the “employers” and the “own-account businesses”. Section 6 concludes.

2) The data

The empirical analysis is based on a national representative survey in Chile, which was designed and collected by OPHI in 2008/2009 with the intention of testing the missing dimensions modules on a national scale.⁴ The data set is a sub-sample of 2,000 households from the 2006 CASEN (Encuesta de Caracterización Socioeconómica Nacional). In addition to the standard demographic and socio-economic variables already present in the CASEN data set, the survey contains detailed information on qualitative employment, empowerment, subjective well-being, and physical safety.

All questions, except for those related to subjective well-being, are addressed to a single member of the household_ the respondent_ who answers for all the other members. For obvious reasons, the respondents only answer the questions related to subjective well-being for themselves.

The data set contains information on 7,952 individuals, of which 3,161 are employed. Among those, 1,348 are asked about their job satisfaction. Only eight individuals out of 1,348 did not answer the question. We then need to exclude those individuals for which we lack some information about their demographic or socio-economic characteristics. This leaves us with a sample of about 1,100 workers. As is the case for most developing countries, self-employment represents nearly 25% of total employment, which is a large share compared to the approximate 10% in industrial countries. The self-employment dummy variable takes the value one when workers state to be either self-employed or employers/boss and zero when workers are employed by an organization, whether public or private.⁵

Self-reported job satisfaction is the dependent variable of our empirical analysis. Individuals are asked the following question: “In general, how satisfied or unsatisfied are you with your job?” Answers have to belong to one of the four categories: “Very satisfied”, “Fairly satisfied”, “Not very satisfied”, and “Not at all satisfied”. We recoded the answers so that “4” reflects the highest job satisfaction category and “1” the lowest job satisfaction category. As these are ordered data, we use as a main model an ordered logit regression. OLS, logit, and multinomial logit regressions are run as robustness checks.

⁴ Detailed information on OPHI’s data set and survey modules can be found on the OPHI website.

⁵ Individuals working as domestic servants are included among the employees. However, their exclusion from the sample does not affect the results. In contrast, unpaid relatives and armed/security forces are excluded from the analysis given their particular status. This choice does not affect the results, as only eight observations belong to these categories in total.

It is worth mentioning that as the data set only contains cross-section elements that are relevant for our research question, we cannot directly address potential endogeneity problems. However, unlike previous works on industrial countries, we have an exhaustive number of control variables. In addition to the standard controls - which include age, tenure, gender, size of the firm, hours of work, income, region, education, industry, occupation, and self-employment - we also have information on the qualitative characteristics of employment: job protection, occupational hazard, and direct measures of procedural utility.⁶ These indicators of quality of employment, along with self-employment, represent the main explanatory variables of our model.

3) Indicators of quality of employment and descriptive statistics

The purpose of this section is to explain, one by one, how these indicators have been constructed and to provide some descriptive statistics.

JOB PROTECTION

Job protection refers to the formal arrangements that characterize an economic activity with the aim of protecting workers against negative shocks related to employment (Lugo, 2007). For instance, the retirement pension system protects workers against the consequences of age, whereas the paid sick leave protects workers against the consequences of diseases, and so on. Job protection is negatively related to job informality. By definition, informal jobs are the ones that lack job protection.⁷

In our data set, there are six dummy variables reflecting job protection. We constructed a dummy variable equal to one for each of the following situations. If the:

- Individual has a work contract
- Contractual relation is permanent rather than temporary
- Individual is entitled to paid maternity leave (hold for both men and women)
- Individual is entitled to paid sick leave
- Individual is entitled to paid holidays
- Individual contributes to retirement pension

By definition, self-employed individuals do not have any job protection except for voluntary contribution to retirement pension. This means that most descriptive statistics about job protection refer to employees, whereas the comparison between the job protection of employees and of the self-employed is based purely on the *contribution to retirement pension* dummy variable.

The descriptive statistics confirm that informal wage employment is a widespread phenomenon in Chile. Only 40% of the employees have full job protection (i.e., all six dummy variables equal one), and 11% of the employees have no job protection at all (i.e., all dummy variables equal zero). If we look at each dimension of job protection separately, two

⁶ Correlations among the explanatory variables are very low. None exceed 0.4. The correlation table is available upon request.

⁷ Job protection must be distinguished from job security, typically used in the existing literature on industrial countries. Job security, at least as it is defined by Blanchflower (1999), refers to people's perceptions about the probability of losing their job. One can expect job security and job protection to be positively correlated. However, the latter includes additional dimensions, and it is not a subjective, reported variable.

important insights emerge. First, “maternity leave” and “length of contract” are the most frequent types of job informality. 33% of female employees are not entitled to a paid maternity leave and 34% of employees have temporary contracts. Second, female employees and employees in rural areas are the most affected by the lack of job protection.⁸

We now compare the share of individuals who contribute to a retirement pension in the self-employment and wage employment sector. It is worth mentioning that Chilean employees (in the formal sector) must contribute at least 10% of their wages to a retirement pension, whereas for self-employed workers contributing to a pension is voluntary. Descriptive statistics reveal that self-employed workers contribute significantly less to retirement pensions than employees. Only 30% of the self-employed contribute to retirement pensions, compared to the 83% of the employees (see Table 1 below). This difference is significant at the 99% level.

Table 1: Raw mean differences between the employees and the self-employed

	Self-employed	Employees
Contribution to pension	0.297*** (0.017)	0.831 (0.007)
Lack of facilities	0.310*** (0.059)	-0.139 (0.282)
Heavy work	-0.0139*** (0.052)	0.056 (0.031)
Accident	0.030*** (0.006)	0.062 (0.005)
Job satisfaction	2.750 (0.048)	2.762 (0.029)
Autonomy	3.297*** (0.048)	2.753 (0.035)
Competence	3.104*** (0.062)	2.800 (0.041)
Relatedness	3.344** (0.029)	3.271 (0.020)

Note: Unweighted means

Significance levels: *0.05<p<0.1, **0.01<p<0.05, ***p<0.01

Standard errors are in parentheses.

An important question is whether the observed lack of job protection represents a voluntary choice of the affected workers, or whether it has been imposed by some external constraints. It might well be that these employees prefer temporary jobs, or that most self-employed individuals do not want to contribute to a retirement pension. However, it could also be that these employees have no other choice than to accept an informal job, and that financial constraints prevent most self-employed from contributing to a retirement pension. We try to shed some light on this issue in the next section.

OCCUPATIONAL HAZARD

Occupational hazard refers to poor health and safety conditions in the workplace. As far as we know, no detailed economic study establishes a linkage between occupational hazards

⁸ See Table 1 in the appendix for more details.

and job satisfaction. Furthermore, data information on occupational injuries is rather limited and usually restricted to “insured employees” (Lugo, 2007).

In our data set, five dummy variables reflect occupational hazards. We constructed a dummy variable equal to one for each of the following situations. If the:

- Individual suffered any accidental injury, illness, disability or other mental health problem caused by work during the past 12 months
- Individual’s workplace does not have adequate toilets
- Individual’s workplace does not have clean water
- Individual has to work under uncomfortable postures or spend long hours standing
- Individual is exposed to cutting/grinding machines, loud noise, extreme temperatures, harmful chemicals or heavy loads (workplace exposures)

The descriptive statistics suggest that 30% of workers face no occupational hazards at all (that is, all dummy variables equal zero), and only 0.45% of the workers face full occupational hazard (i.e., all dummy variables equal one). If we look at each dimension separately, it is clear that the dimensions “exposures” and “uncomfortable postures” are very frequent in Chilean workplaces. Nearly 50% of Chilean workers face such types of occupational hazards compared to nearly 12% who do not have access to adequate toilets or clean water and compared to 5% who had a work-related injury. The descriptive analysis also suggests that males and workers in rural areas are most affected by occupational hazards.⁹

Next, we want to compare occupational hazards between self-employed workers and employees. In order to do that, we first run a factor analysis of the five dummy variables representing occupational hazards. The results suggest the existence of two factors.¹⁰ The dummy variables for lack of toilets and lack of clean water load most heavily on factor one. We call this factor “lack of facilities”. The dummy variables for uncomfortable postures and workplace exposures load higher on factor two. We call this factor “heavy work”. The dummy variable *accident* is kept separately because it is poorly correlated with the rest of the variables. These two factors explain 80% of the four variables’ combined variance.¹¹

We now investigate whether there is any significant difference between the self-employed and the employees (see Table 1 above). On the one hand, self-employed workers are on average more likely to lack workplace facilities compared to employees. This difference is significant at the 99% level. On the other hand, employees are on average more likely to do heavy work and to have an accident/injury/illness due to work. These differences are significant at the 99% level. We conclude that the self-employed and employees are affected by different types of occupational hazards. Employees are more likely to do dangerous and heavy work, whereas the self-employed are more likely to lack decent workplace infrastructures.

PROCEDURAL UTILITY FROM INDEPENDENCE

The definition of procedural utility is given by Frey et al. (2004): “*Procedural utility means that individuals not only value outcomes but also the conditions and the processes which lead to outcomes.*” Individuals attribute positive intrinsic value to independence as

⁹ For more details see Table 2 in the appendix.

¹⁰ For more details see Table 3 in the appendix.

¹¹ If we add the dummy variable for accident in the factor analysis, only 65% of the five combined variables’ is explained by the two factors.

compared to hierarchy. They enjoy the freedom of doing what they like rather than being subject to decisions made by others. The mainstream economic literature has taken self-employment as an important case for independence in the working life. Unlike employees, self-employed workers are not subject to a hierarchy and thus do not have to obey orders given by their superiors. This “taste for independence” seems to account for the higher job satisfaction reported by the self-employed compared to employees in industrialized countries. We test whether this is also true in Chile. Following the lines of Benz and Frey (2008a), we introduce direct measures of procedural utility from independence in the job satisfaction regression. If it is true that the self-employment utility premium _ provided that it also exists in Chile_ is due to procedural utility from independence, then the effect of self-employment on job satisfaction should disappear once we control for such procedural aspects of work.

Procedural utility is derived from the fulfillment of a psychological need for what psychologists call “self-determination” (Deci and Ryan, 2000). According to psychological research, self-determination is strongly correlated with independence, and it is usually restricted under hierarchy. Self-determination can be associated with the so-called “empowerment” by development-related social sciences. Ibrahim and Alkire (2007) underlines the instrumental and intrinsic importance of empowerment for impoverished communities. This paper tests whether Chilean workers value empowerment at work.

OPHI’s modules contain extensive information on individuals’ empowerment and self-determination, both at the workplace and at home (Alkire, 2007; Ibrahim and Alkire, 2007; Samman, 2007). We derive our direct measures of procedural utility from independence through the three components of self-determination that have been found to be of crucial importance for human well being (Deci and Ryan, 2000): *autonomy*, *competence*, and *relatedness*. In order to assess *autonomy*, individuals are asked to choose from 1 to 4 (where “1” is “Not true at all” and “4” is “Completely true”) how true the following statement is: “At work I have a lot of autonomy and I can organize myself as I want.” In order to assess *competence*, individuals are asked: “To what extent do you feel that you have the possibility to progress and improve at work?” Answers have to belong to one of the four following categories: “Always,” “Frequently,” “Occasionally,” or “Never.” We recoded the answers so that “4” reflects the highest category and “1” the lowest category. Finally, individuals are asked three questions about *relatedness*, namely, about their relationship with the people with whom they regularly interact. Again, the answers are ranked from one to four, where “4” represents the highest degree of *relatedness*. Our *relatedness* variable is constructed as an average of the answers to the three questions just mentioned.

We now compare the reported job satisfaction and self-determination/empowerment at work between the self-employed and employees (see Table 1 above). Some interesting results arise. Unlike in industrialized countries, there is no significant positive difference in the mean of reported job satisfaction between the self-employed and employees. On average, self-employed workers report 0.012 index points (on a scale of 1_4) lower satisfaction with their job than employees –although the difference is not significant. This seems to partly contradict the dualistic view of labor markets in developing countries. If self-employment is merely a

sort of disguised unemployment, self-employed workers should be on average less satisfied with their jobs than employees.¹²

In contrast, the raw differences for each of the three components of self-determination show significantly higher self-determination for self-employed workers. On average, self-employed workers report 0.544 index points higher *autonomy*, 0.304 index points higher *competence*, and 0.073 higher *relatedness* than employees (on a scale of 1_4). These differences are all very significant.

To summarize, descriptive statistics suggest that self-employment work is associated with a higher level of workers' self-determination than wage work. However, this difference is not reflected in higher job satisfaction. Two explanations can be given to this evidence. Either Chilean workers have no procedural preferences for independence as their counterparts in industrial countries do, or the self-employment utility premium is offset by the lack of job protection and of workplace facilities. In the latter case, the data should not reject the hypothesis that job protection and workplace facilities are positive determinants of job satisfaction. We investigate this issue in our regression analysis.

4) Empirical Findings

Multivariate regressions are estimated using an ordered logit model as job satisfaction is an ordinaly scaled dependent variable. OLS, logit, and multinomial logit regressions are used as robustness checks.

We start by running a standard regression in which we do not control for the qualitative characteristics of employment. The aim is to compare our results with the empirical evidence from industrialized countries. Findings are presented in Table 2, column (1). Income is certainly a major determinant of job satisfaction (p-value=0.000), as it is in industrial countries. In contrast, Chilean workers do not seem to care about hours of work. Unlike Benz and Frey (2008a), we find no negative relationship between firm size and job satisfaction. Consistent with previous studies, women are more satisfied with their jobs than men.

The coefficient on the self-employment dummy variable is positive but only marginally significant (p-value=0.084). The result is not very robust, either, as in the OLS and logit regressions the coefficient is not significant.¹³ This is not in line with the previous literature on industrial countries that consistently finds a highly significant utility premium from self-employment even after controlling for socio-demographic characteristics and quantitative economic aspects of employment. We think that this result can be attributed to our choice of disregarding qualitative aspects of employment that may be relevant for Chilean workers.

The regression in Table 2, column (2), includes the three indicators for occupational hazard. The results suggest that the *lack of facilities* has a significant negative effect on job satisfaction (p-value=0.001). Surprisingly, *heavy work* and *accident* do not seem to affect job satisfaction.¹⁴ We check whether this is due to wage compensating differentials. However, we find no evidence that heavy and dangerous work is compensated by a higher wage.

¹² This is true unless the share of informal wage employment is so large to significantly decrease the overall average job satisfaction of the employees.

¹³ See Table 5 and 6 in the appendix.

¹⁴ However, it is worth mentioning that in the OLS, logit, and multinomial logit regressions the coefficient on the *accident* dummy variable is negative and significant at the 95% level.

Table 2: Ordered Logit regression results

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Dep. Variable: Job satisfaction	Ordered Logit	Ordered Logit	Ordered Logit
Self-employment	0.419* (1.73)	0.597** (2.37)	0.557** (2.15)
Lack of facilities	-	-0.308*** (-3.02)	-
Heavy work	-	0.037 (0.45)	-
Accident	-	-0.321 (-0.97)	-
Contribution to pension	-	-	0.537 ** (2.35)
Size of the firm			
6-9 persons	0.693* (1.94)	0.688* (1.95)	0.587 (1.60)
10-49	0.193 (0.79)	0.262 (1.05)	0.085 (0.33)
50-199	0.275 (1.02)	0.337 (1.24)	0.139 (0.50)
>200	0.547** (2.02)	0.588** (2.19)	0.420 (1.45)
Log net income	0.824*** (6.32)	0.791*** (5.89)	0.750*** (5.48)
Hours of work	0.007 (1.50)	0.008* (1.655)	0.008 (1.55)
Gender (male)	-0.421** (-2.02)	-0.352* (-1.81)	-0.363* (-1.89)
Age	0.038 (1.01)	0.018 (0.52)	0.015 (0.38)
(Age) ²	-0.0002 (-0.60)	-0.00005 (-0.15)	0.0003 (0.08)
Tenure	-0.040* (-1.84)	-0.035 (-1.62)	-0.036 (-1.60)
(Tenure) ²	0.001** (2.01)	0.0009* (1.91)	0.0009 (1.61)
Region (urban)	-0.368* (-1.84)	-0.340* (-1.67)	-0.339* (-1.67)
Education dummies	5 categories	5 categories	5 categories
Industry dummies	7 categories	7 categories	7 categories
Occupation dummies	9 categories	9 categories	9 categories
Log pseudolikelihood	-144276.45	-141673.47	-141151.73
Observations	1107	1097	1095

Note: Weighted ordered logit regressions with robust standard errors. t-statistics in parentheses.
Significance levels: *0.05<p<0.1, **0.01<p<0.05, ***p<0.01

It stands out that after controlling for occupational hazards, the positive coefficient on the self-employment dummy variable has become very significant (p-value=0.018). This finding supports the argument that the self-employment utility premium also exists in developing countries, but it may be offset by the lack of decent infrastructures that characterizes self-employment activities.

We now look at the job protection indicator as measured by the *contribution to retirement pension* dummy variable.¹⁵ Occupational hazard indicators are temporarily excluded from the regression. The regression in Table 2, column (3), shows that contributing to a retirement pension is a positive determinant of job satisfaction. The coefficient is positive and significant at the 95% level (p-value=0.019). Chilean workers who contribute to retirement pensions are on average more satisfied with their job than those who do not, everything else being equal. Furthermore, after controlling for job protection, the self-employment utility premium emerges. The positive coefficient on the self-employment dummy variable increases in size and becomes significant at the 95% level (p-value=0.032). This seems to suggest that the no contribution to retirement pensions for self-employed workers is not *de facto* voluntary. It is likely that at least some of the self-employed would like to contribute to a retirement pension but financial constraints prevent them from doing so. Under the assumption of full rationality, if the self-employed chose not to contribute to a retirement pension because they did not value it, adding such an indicator in the job satisfaction regression should not have any effect on the self-employment dummy variable. Our results suggest, instead, that the lack of job protection that characterizes the self-employment sector reduces the job satisfaction of the self-employed.

In order to verify the effects of the remaining job protection variables on job satisfaction, we run a regression using only a sub-sample of employees. The factor analysis of the six variables reflecting job protection suggests the existence of only one factor composed of all variables but *length of contract*.¹⁶ This factor, which we call *job protection*, explains 70% of the five variables' combined variance.¹⁷ The regression results are reported in Table 3, column (1). The coefficient of the job protection indicator is positive and very significant (p-value=0.001). On the other hand, having a permanent rather than a temporary contract does not affect job satisfaction.

Taken together, these findings reject the argument that individuals choose to work in the informal sector to avoid labor protection laws. An exception can be made for the length of contract: according to the data, it might well be that some workers voluntarily choose temporary jobs, for example because they offer greater flexibility.

In the next step, we include both the occupational hazard and job protection indicators in the full sample regression (see Table 3, column (2)). Consistent with the previous regressions, the positive coefficient on *contribution to retirement pension* is still significant at the 95% level (p-value=0.021) and the negative coefficient of *lack of facilities* is still

¹⁵ We do not use the other indicators of job protection in order to avoid multicollinearity problems. Indeed, by definition, self-employed individuals do not have an employment contract and are not entitled to the non wage benefits such as paid maternity leave, paid holiday, and paid sick leave.

¹⁶ For more details see Table 4 in the appendix.

¹⁷ If we also include *length of contract*, the explained combined variance drops to 63%.

significant at the 99% level (p -value=0.004). This suggests that both dimensions have a direct and independent effect on job satisfaction. Therefore, both job protection and job safety need adequate and separate attention when analyzing labor markets. As far as self-employment is concerned, when we control for both job protection and occupational hazards, the self-employment dummy variable coefficient increases and becomes significant at the 99% level (p -value=0.008). Job protection and occupational hazard being equal, Chilean self-employed workers are more satisfied with their jobs than Chilean employees. This is consistent with hypothesis that the self-employment utility premium may not appear in the raw differences because it is offset by the poor job protection and by the lack of facilities that characterize self-employment activities. Our final step is to investigate whether the observed positive relationship between self-employment and job satisfaction is due to procedural utility from independence.

We now run a direct test for procedural utility by including the indicators of the three components of self-determination in the job satisfaction regression. The results are reported in Table 3, column (3). It stands out that the coefficient on the self-employment dummy variable is no longer significant (p -value=0.209). This means that the self-determination/empowerment experienced at work explains the self-employment-job satisfaction effect completely. Furthermore, the coefficients on *autonomy*, *competence*, and *relatedness* are positive and highly significant. This result is consistent with the hypothesis that, conditional on income, job protection, job safety, and so on, Chilean self-employed workers are more satisfied with their job than Chilean employees because they derive procedural utility from independence.

Finally, we run OLS, logit, and multinomial logit regressions as robustness checks. In the logit regression, we recoded the data so that the dependent variable takes the value one if an individual selects “Very satisfied” or “Fairly satisfied,” and the value zero if “Not very satisfied” or “Not at all satisfied” is selected. The logit model sacrifices some information in exchange for more flexibility: we do not need to assume either cardinality or single crossing property. The same is true for the multinomial logit model. We find that our results are very robust across different specifications of the model except for the *accident* dummy variable.¹⁸ OLS, logit, and multinomial logit regressions all suggest that having suffered any accidental injury, illness, disability or other mental health problem caused by work during the past 12 months does in fact reduce job satisfaction. However, the result does not hold for the ordered logit regressions.

¹⁸ Results are reported in Table 5, 6, and 7 in the appendix.

Table 3: Direct test for procedural utility

	Sample of employees	Sample of all workers	
	(1) Ordered Logit	(2) Ordered Logit	(3) Ordered Logit
Dep. Variable: Job satisfaction			
Self-employment	-	0.710*** (2.65)	0.361 (1.26)
Lack of facilities	-0.289* (-1.82)	-0.284*** (-2.91)	-0.239** (-2.16)
Heavy work	0.021 (0.18)	0.012 (0.14)	0.100 (1.15)
Accident	-0.425 (-1.10)	-0.295 (-0.88)	-0.185 (-0.48)
Contribution pension	-	0.523** (2.30)	0.398* (1.70)
Job protection	0.450*** (3.44)	-	-
Length of contract (permanent)	0.196 (0.86)	-	-
Autonomy	-	-	0.177** (1.99)
Competence	-	-	0.281*** (3.79)
Relatedness	-	-	0.593*** (4.28)
Log net income	0.767*** (4.23)	0.743*** (5.35)	0.637*** (4.48)
Hours of work	0.011 (1.22)	0.0087 (1.62)	0.010 (1.61)
Gender (male)	-0.183 (-0.73)	-0.310 (-1.58)	-0.182 (-0.86)
Age	0.054 (1.27)	0.009 (0.22)	0.017 (0.38)
(Age) ²	-0.0004 (-0.96)	0.0007 (0.16)	-0.0003 (0.08)
Tenure	-0.0795* (-2.02)	-0.034 (-1.50)	-0.041* (-1.72)
(Tenure) ²	0.002* (1.66)	0.0009 (1.63)	0.0012** (2.01)
Region (urban)	-0.449* (-1.66)	-0.323 (-1.58)	-0.234 (-1.00)
Firms' size dummies	5 categories	5 categories	5 categories
Education dummies	5 categories	5 categories	5 categories
Industry dummies	7 categories	7 categories	7 categories
Occupation dummies	9 categories	9 categories	9 categories
Log pseudolikelihood	-87501.601	-138882.91	-120682.16
Observations	733	1082	981

Note: Weighted ordered logit regressions with robust standard errors. t-statistics in parentheses.
Significance levels: *0.05<p<0.1, **0.01<p<0.05, ***p<0.01

5) Heterogeneous self-employment

One could claim that self-employment in a developing country can be very heterogeneous. Employers -namely individuals who hold their own firm and invest in external sources of labor- are expected to face different labor market conditions than self-employed individuals who only use their own labor to engage in professional activities or run small family businesses. To some extent, Chilean employers are more comparable to the self-employed from industrial countries, with a large desire for independence and a strong entrepreneurial ambition. On the other hand, self-employed workers with own-account businesses are more likely to live under very poor and precarious conditions, and therefore, the dualistic theory of labor market is more likely to apply. We address this issue in the following empirical analysis.

The design of the survey allows us to make the distinction between different types of self-employment. When asked about their main occupation, individuals have to choose between different categories: employer/boss, self-employed, and several types of dependent employment. 64 workers selected employer/boss and 353 selected self-employed. In the previous regressions, these two types of workers were grouped together to form the self-employment category. Now, we create two distinct dummy variables: an *employer* dummy variable that takes the value “1” when the workers select employer/boss, and an *own-account business* dummy variable taking the value “1” if the worker select self-employed. Workers who are employed by an organization, either public or private, represent the reference group.

We start by looking at the raw mean differences of reported job satisfaction. On average, self-employed workers with own-account business report 0.116 index points lower job satisfaction than employees (on a scale of 1_4), whereas self-employed workers who are also employers report 0.556 index points higher job satisfaction than employees. These differences are significant at the 95% and 99% level, respectively. This corroborates the hypothesis of large heterogeneity in the self-employment sector.

We now run the same regressions as in Section 4. Results are summarized in Table 4. The regression in column (1) shows that, conditional on income and personal characteristics, employees are as satisfied with their jobs as self-employed with own-account business. As expected, the *employer* dummy variable is positive and significant at the 99% level.

In regression (2), we control for occupational hazards and job protection. Interestingly, the positive coefficient on the *own-account business* dummy variable becomes significant almost at the 95% level (p-value=0.053). This confirms our results in Section 4.

Next, we investigate whether the higher job satisfaction reported by the self-employed and the employers is due to procedural utility from independence. Consistent with our previous findings, the regression in column (3) shows that self-determination/empowerment explains the utility premium of the *own-account business* completely. Surprisingly, the coefficient on the *employer* dummy variable is still significant, although the significance and the size of the coefficient have strongly decreased. The p-value has increased from 0.004 to 0.037, while the coefficient has dropped by 30%. To uphold that the procedural utility from independence accounts for at least part of the utility premium from being an employer, we compare the effects of being an employer on the predicted values of job satisfaction when we control for direct measures of procedural utility and when we do not.

Table 4: Ordered Logit regression results

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Dep. Variable: Job satisfaction	Ordered Logit	Ordered Logit	Ordered Logit
Own-account business	0.273 (1.05)	0.560* (1.93)	0.180 (0.56)
Employer	0.969*** (2.58)	1.194*** (2.90)	0.833** (2.08)
Lack of facilities	-	-0.279*** (-2.85)	-0.229** (-2.07)
Heavy work	-	-0.008 (0.09)	0.078 (0.89)
Accident	-	-0.305 (-0.91)	-0.198 (-0.51)
Contribution to pension	-	0.495** (2.14)	0.370 (1.58)
Autonomy	-	-	0.184** (2.05)
Competence	-	-	0.278*** (3.75)
Relatedness	-	-	0.602*** (4.31)
Log net income	0.800*** (6.04)	0.727*** (5.16)	0.617*** (4.30)
Hours of work	0.007 (1.60)	0.008 (1.56)	0.010 (1.57)
Gender (male)	-0.406** (-2.12)	-0.299 (-1.52)	-0.163 (-0.76)
Age	0.041 (1.06)	0.010 (0.26)	0.019 (0.43)
(Age) ²	-0.0003 (-0.67)	0.00004 (0.11)	-0.0007 (-0.15)
Tenure	-0.040* (-1.80)	-0.032 (-1.44)	-0.040 (-1.66)
(Tenure) ²	0.001* (1.88)	0.0008* (1.51)	0.0011 (1.89)
Region (urban)	-0.345* (-1.71)	-0.299 (-1.45)	-0.196 (-0.84)
Firms' size dummies	5 categories	5 categories	5 categories
Education dummies	5 categories	5 categories	5 categories
Industry dummies	7 categories	7 categories	7 categories
Occupation dummies	9 categories	9 categories	9 categories
Log pseudo likelihood	-143912.71	-138597.95	-120414.16
Observations	1107	1082	981

Note: Weighted ordered logit regressions with robust standard errors. t-statistics in parentheses.
Significance levels: *0.05<p<0.1, **0.01<p<0.05, ***p<0.01

Results show that being an employer decreases the probability of reporting job satisfaction equal to 1 or 2 and increases the probability of reporting job satisfaction equal to 3 or 4, holding all other variables at their mean. However, these effects are smaller –in absolute terms - once we control for *autonomy*, *competence*, and *relatedness*.¹⁹ This confirms our hypothesis that procedural utility from independence accounts for at least part of the utility premium from being an employer.

How is it then that the *employer* dummy variable is still significant? Something that is valuable to employers is probably not captured by the model. A plausible explanation is that, in addition to enjoying the freedom of doing what they like, employers also get intrinsic benefits from exerting power and authority over others. As employees dislike obeying the orders made by their superiors, it might well be that the superiors like to give orders to others. Research by psychologists does indeed support a preference for power (McClelland, 1975; Mulder, 1975; Poppe, 2003). However, this is only one among various possible explanations. More research should be done in this direction.

6) Conclusions

This paper uses a unique, nationally representative dataset with extensive information on both quantitative and qualitative characteristics of employment to investigate the determinants of job satisfaction in Chile. We find that in addition to income, Chilean workers have preferences for job protection, workplace facilities - such as adequate toilets and clean water- and independence/empowerment at work. These results suggest that qualitative and procedural characteristics of employment can be valuable to workers as quantitative, instrumental indicators.

As far as the debate on the role of the informal sector in developing countries is concerned, workers' desire for independence can potentially deter them from entering the formal wage employment in favor of the self-employment sector. The picture of the self-employment sector that emerges from this empirical analysis is far from being as negative as the one depicted by the traditional dualistic view. The self-employment sector has both desirable (independence) and undesirable characteristics (lack of job protection and of decent infrastructures), which appear to compensate each other, so that overall, Chilean self-employed workers are as satisfied with their job as Chilean employees. Furthermore, we also find that having temporary rather than permanent working contracts does not affect job satisfaction. Thus, overall, we cannot exclude that at least some workers self-select into the formal and informal sector according to their respective preferences.

Nevertheless, this study also points out the large heterogeneity in the self-employment sector. Self-employed workers with own-account businesses are the most penalized by the lack of job protection and of workplace facilities, so that their unconditional job satisfaction is lower than that of any other group. On the contrary, the findings relative to Chilean employers are consistent with the evidence from industrial countries: the utility premium from self-employment appears unconditionally of income, job protection, and occupational hazard. This suggests that some of the insights from the mainstream literature can also be applied to the developing world.

¹⁹ Results are reported in Table 8 in the appendix.

Important recommendations emerge from this study for both policy makers and future research. First, there is an urgent need to collect data on the qualitative and procedural dimensions of employment, which appear to be relevant for individuals. This is especially true for developing countries, where informal employment is predominant. This will not only increase our understanding of labor market conditions but will also facilitate comparisons among countries. Our results strongly rely on information about job protection and occupational hazards, which is usually missing in households' data sets. Finally, development policies aimed at increasing job protection, workplace safety, and empowerment at work should be strongly encouraged and the qualitative dimensions of employment should be taken into account when planning and evaluating policies against poverty.

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Appendix 1: Tables

Table 1: Dimensions of Job Protection

	Overall	Female	Rural
Having a contract	83%	78%	76%
Permanent contract	66%	64%	48%
Paid maternity leave	62%	67%	54%
Paid sick leave	76%	73%	70%
Paid holiday	69%	65%	60%
Contribution to pension	72%	70%	67%

Note: This table shows the percentage of individuals for whom the dummy variables listed in the column are equal to one. In the first five dimensions, the percentages refer to the employees, whereas in the contribution to retirement pension dimension the percentage refers to the workers.

Table 2: Dimensions of Occupational Hazard

	Overall	Female	Rural
Accident	5,2%	4,5%	5,4%
Lack of adequate toilets	13%	7,7%	23%
Lack of clean water	11%	6,7%	20%
Exposures	47%	35%	69%
Uncomfortable posture	47%	44%	53%

Note: This table shows the percentage of workers for whom the dummy variables listed in the column are equal to one.

Table 3: Factor analysis of occupational hazard

Factor	Eigenvalue	Difference	Proportion	Cumulative
Factor 1	1.85239	0.53612	0.4631	0.4631
Factor 2	1.31627	0.74222	0.3291	0.7922
Factor 3	0.57405	0.31677	0.1435	0.9357
Factor 4	0.25728	.	0.0643	1.0000

Note: Principal component factors. LR test: independent vs. saturated: $\chi^2(6) = 1367.39$ Prob> $\chi^2 = 0.0000$

Factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances:

Variable	Factor 1	Factor 2	Uniqueness
Exposures	0.4585	0.7061	0.2912
Lack of clean water	0.8487	-0.3896	0.1279
Lack of adequate toilets	0.8673	-0.3435	0.1298
Uncomfortable postures	0.4119	0.7401	0.2825

Table 4: Factor analysis of job protection

Factor	Eigenvalue	Difference	Proportion	Cumulative
Factor 1	3.56689	2.97189	0.7134	0.7134
Factor 2	0.59500	0.19300	0.1190	0.8324
Factor 3	0.40199	0.15867	0.0804	0.9128
Factor 4	0.24332	0.05052	0.0487	0.9614
Factor 5	0.19280	.	0.0386	1.0000

Note: Principal component factors. LR test: independent vs. saturated: $\chi^2(10) = 4993.17$ Prob> $\chi^2 = 0.0000$

Factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances:

Variable	Factor 1	Uniqueness
Having a contract	0.8739	0.2363
Paid sick leave	0.9107	0.1706
Paid holidays	0.8459	0.2845
Paid maternity leave	0.7578	0.4257
Contribution to pension	0.8271	0.3159

Table 5: OLS regression results

Dep.variable: Job satisfaction	(1) OLS	(2) OLS	(3) OLS
Self-employment	0.097 (1.21)	0.191** (2.24)	0.0163 (0.18)
Contribution pension	-	0.220*** (3.08)	0.147** (2.06)
Lack of facilities	-	-0.067** (-2.11)	-0.035 (-1.09)
Heavy work	-	-0.021 (-0.73)	0.007 (0.27)
Accident	-	-0.232** (-2.11)	-0.223 (-2.00)
Autonomy	-	-	0.110*** (3.87)
Competence	-	-	0.125*** (5.19)
Relatedness	-	-	0.258*** (5.83)
Log net income	0.359*** (8.70)	0.343*** (8.29)	0.286*** (6.76)
Hours of work	0.003* (1.85)	0.004** (2.11)	0.003 (1.58)
Gender (male)	-0.124* (-1.82)	-0.096 (-1.40)	-0.0317 (-0.46)
Age	-0.003 (-0.22)	-0.011 (-0.79)	-0.010 (-0.69)
(Age) ²	0.0001 (0.67)	0.0002 (1.22)	0.0001 (0.99)
Tenure	-0.004 (-0.67)	-0.003 (-0.47)	-0.0004 (0.06)
(Tenure) ²	0.0002 (1.54)	0.0002 (1.39)	0.0001 (0.92)
Region (urban)	-0.348 (-0.49)	-0.039 (-0.56)	-0.031 (-0.43)
Firms' size dummies	5 categories	5 categories	5 categories
Education dummies	5 categories	5 categories	5 categories
Industry dummies	7 categories	7 categories	7 categories
Occupation dummies	9 categories	9 categories	9 categories
R-squared	0.176	0.196	0.279
Observations	1107	1082	981

Note: OLS regressions with robust standard errors. t-statistics in parentheses.

Significance levels : *0.05<p<0.1, **0.01<p<0.05, ***p<0.01

Table 6: Logit regression results

Dep. Variable: Job satisfaction	(1) Logit	(2) Logit	(3) Logit
Self-employment	0.373 (1.43)	0.681** (2.21)	0.434 (1.23)
Contribution pension	-	0.616** (2.30)	0.555** (1.98)
Lack of facilities	-	-0.288** (-2.48)	-0.247* (-1.93)
Heavy work	-	0.050 (0.47)	0.124 (1.10)
Accident	-	-0.585* (-1.67)	-0.446 (-1.09)
Autonomy	-	-	0.184* (1.78)
Competence	-	-	0.304*** (0.358)
Relatedness	-	-	0.366** (2.30)
Size of the firm			
6-9 persons	0.659* (1.67)	0.477 (1.19)	0.360 (0.86)
10-49	0.177 (0.60)	0.116 (0.38)	0.176 (0.51)
50-199	0.177 (0.57)	0.061 (0.18)	0.077 (0.23)
>200	0.662** (2.02)	0.586* (1.73)	0.573 (1.56)
Log net income	1.002*** (5.48)	0.933*** (4.88)	0.794*** (4.06)
Hours of work	0.007 (0.95)	0.007 (0.92)	0.009 (1.06)
Gender	-0.389 (-1.54)	-0.254 (-0.98)	-0.040 (-0.14)
Age	0.206 (0.38)	-0.030 (-0.057)	-0.020 (-0.35)
(Age) ²	-0.00009 (-0.15)	0.0005 (0.84)	0.0003 (0.49)
Tenure	-0.053* (-1.89)	-0.044 (-1.54)	-0.046 (-1.49)
(Tenure) ²	0.002** (2.52)	0.00147** (0.0007)	0.002** (2.23)
Region (urban)	-0.248 (-1.00)	-0.198 (-0.79)	-0.062 (-0.22)
Education dummies	5 categories	5 categories	5 categories
Industry dummies	7 categories	7 categories	7 categories
Occupation dummies	9 categories	9 categories	9 categories
Log pseudolikelihood	-66342.113	-62924.253	-54091.147
Observations	1107	1082	981

Note: Weighted logit regressions with robust standard errors. t-statistics in parentheses.
Significance levels: *0.05<p<0.1, **0.01<p<0.05, ***p<0.01

Table 7: Multinomial logit regression results

	(1)	(2)	(4)
Dep. Variable: Job satisfaction	Not_at_all_satisfied	Not_very_satisfied	Very_satisfied
Self-employment	-0.561 (-1.16)	-0.362 (-1.05)	0.721** (2.10)
Log net income	-1.056*** (-3.66)	-0.773*** (-3.90)	0.323* (1.77)
Lack of facilities	0.393** (2.05)	0.153 (1.21)	-0.167 (-1.18)
Heavy work	0.104 (0.60)	-0.110 (-0.94)	-0.0500 (-0.39)
Accident	1.154** (2.17)	0.516 (1.34)	0.345 (0.80)
Contribution pension	-0.999** (-2.42)	-0.495* (-1.70)	-0.0009 (-0.00)
Personal characteristics	controlled	controlled	controlled
Education dummies	5 categories	5 categories	5 categories
Industry dummies	7 categories	7 categories	7 categories
Occupation dummies	9 categories	9 categories	9 categories
Log pseudolikelihood	-131528.92	-131528.92	-131528.92
Observations	1082	1082	1082

Note: Weighted multinomial logit regressions with robust standard errors. Base outcome: (3) "Quite satisfied". t-statistics in parentheses. Significance levels: *0.05<p<0.1, **0.01<p<0.05, ***p<0.01

Table 8: Effects of being an employer/boss on predicted job satisfaction

	Not controlling for procedural aspects of work	Controlling for procedural aspects of work
Prob(y=1/x=1) – Prob(y=1/x=0)	-0.0504	-0.0318
Prob(y=2/x=1) – Prob(y=2/x=0)	-0.1730	-0.1278
Prob(y=3/x=1) – Prob(y=3/x=0)	0.0077	0.0157
Prob(y=4/x=1) – Prob(y=4/x=0)	0.2310	0.1438

Note: This table shows the difference between the effects of being an employer (x) on the probability of reporting a job satisfaction (Y) from 1 to 4 when we control for procedural aspects of work and when we do not.

Appendix 2: Variable Description

- *Job satisfaction*: ordered variable that takes values from one to four, where “4” represent the highest job satisfaction category and “1” the lowest job satisfaction category.
- *Self-employment*: dummy variable that takes a value of one if the individual’s primary occupation is self-employment or owner of a firm.
- *Age*: age of the individuals at the time of the interview.
- *Education*: dummy variable for level of education completed. Base category: primary education.
- *Tenure*: number of years the individuals had their current job at the time of the interview.
- *Zone*: dummy variable that takes value one if the individual lives in an urban zone.
- *Salaried wage (log)*: logarithm of the last net monthly income from main occupation.
- *Self-employed earnings (log)*: logarithm of the sum of the last monthly income from main business and the market values of products from the main business which have been used for personal or household consumption.
- *Hours of work*: number of weekly working hours in the main occupation.
- *Size of firm*: dummy variable for the number of people in Chile working in the firm which corresponds to the main occupation. Base category: from 1 to 5 individuals.
- *Type of industry*: dummy variable for type of industry based on the ISIC Rev.2 classification.
- *Type of occupation*: dummy variable for type of industry based on the ISCO 88 classification.
- *Occupational hazard*: factor analysis, see section 3.
- *Job protection*: factor analysis, see section 3.
- *Self-determination/empowerment at work*: see section 3.
- *Own-account business*: dummy variable that takes a value of one if the individual’s primary occupation is self-employment.
- *Employer*: dummy variable that takes a value of one if the individual’s primary occupation is owner of a firm.

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